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The advocate must learn to live in the tension between what the
legal precedents are and what he and his client would like them to be.
For the Solicitor General, who briefs and argues the United States cases
before the Supreme Court, every aspect of this tension is heightened: his
client is the United States, his court is the Supreme Court, and his precedents are the Court's own. Moreover, his responsibility is greater. Because he speaks for the executive branch, the Court weighs his words
more heavily. Someday a thoughtful and intelligent book will be written
about the Solicitor General and this tension. Lincoln Caplan's The
Tenth Justice: The Solicitor General and the Rule of Law I is not it.
The Tenth Justice has three themes. The first is that the Office of
the Solicitor General, until quite recently, has been largely "independent." Caplan's definition of "independent" as applied to the Solicitor
General is somewhat obscure, but it seems to have two elements: first,
that the Solicitor General should have only limited contact with top administration officials; and second, that the Solicitor General need respond in only a limited way to the goals of the administration. Thus,
Caplan believes that the Solicitor General historically has acted as a
* B.A., Harvard College; J.D., Harvard Law School.
t B.A., Rice University, 1977; J.D., Yale Law School, 1981. The author worked in the
Solicitor General's office under Charlm Fried from July 1985 to April 1987, after which he became
one of William Bradford Reynolds' deputies in the Civil Rights Division, where he works now.
Accordingly, he has worked for the two chief villains in Caplan's book-Fried and Reynolds-and
even earned from Caplan a disparaging note of his own. See L. CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE:
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW 130 (1987). The opinions in this review are Mr.
Clegg's own.
1. L. CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW

(1987).
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thirty-fifth law clerk to the Court, 2 uncritically summarizing the state of
the current jurisprudence and its bearing on the case at hand. Caplan
argues, however, that under the Reagan administration this has all
changed, and that now the Solicitor General is shamelessly limiting and
attacking the Court's precedents in pursuit of the President's agenda.
Overarching this first, descriptive theme is a second, normative one:
that the Solicitor General should be less an advocate before the Court
and more a servant of it. Accordingly, the Solicitor General generally
should be insulated from the policymaking concerns of the rest of the
executive branch. In making this point, Caplan develops his third theme:
for the Solicitor General to act otherwise iguores "the rule of law," especially when he undertakes to limit or directly attack Court precedents
with which he disagrees.
Caplan is wrong on all counts. He is wrong in concluding that the
office is in any substantial way less "independent" now than it was in the
past. He is wrong in his presumption that the Solicitor General's office
essentially should be a servant of the Court. And he is wrong in assuming that by not supporting current precedent the Solicitor General undermines the rule of law. Caplan reaches these untenable conclusions
because he objects not to the means used by the Reagan administration,
but to the administration's legal views themselves.

I
Caplan's argument that the Solicitor General's independence suddenly has eroded is necessarily anecdotal; it would of course be impossible to quantify. But even if we do not look beyond his book, Caplan's
evidence is unconvincing. The Tenth Justice thoroughly collects evidence relating to the "independence" of the Solicitor General's office,
and its failure to draw the obvious conclusion is indeed puzzling.
Cap]an recounts, for instance, that President Eisenhower actually
3
edited the Solicitor General's brief in Brown v. Board of Education.
2. According to the Supreme Court's public affairs office, the Court's active Justices currently
employ 34 law clerks.
3. L. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 31-32. Indeed, according to Caplan, Attorney General Herbert Brownell "shift[ed] responsibility for the [Brown v. Board ofEducation] case from the [Solicitor
General's] office to his own." Id. at 28. Prior to the Eisenhower administration, the White Houseand perhaps President Truman himself-was involved in the decision to file an amicus brief for the
United States in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), challenging racially restrictive covenants.
See Elman, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 19461960: An Oral History, 100 HAV. L. REV. 817, 818 (1987) (interview by Norman Silber). Elman
even speculates that the decision to file may have been motivated in part by the fact that "Truman's
Gallup poll ratings at that time were very low" and his Attorney General and Solicitor General
"were political animals, very much aware of the Negro vote." Id.
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Within the Kennedy administration, Solicitor General Archibald Cox

was constantly caught in a pincers movement by Civil Rights Division
chief Burke Marshall and Attorney General Robert Kennedy. While

Caplan recounts Victor Navasky's documentation of Cox's predicament, 4

apparently he is unimpressed by it; nevertheless, he is horrified by the

thought that pressure might be brought on the current Solicitor General
by Civil Rights Division head Brad Reynolds "'running to the [Attorney

General].'

"5

Caplan further discusses that, under Presidents Nixon and Ford, Solicitor General Robert Bork "regularly found means to carry the Administration's message to the Court. He was a more enthusiastic advocate of

Nixon's legal notions than [Solicitor General Erwin] Griswold had been
...

and he was equally forthright about making arguments favored by

Ford."' 6 Similarly, Caplan tells how in the course of preparing the government's brief in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 7 during the Carter administration, suggestions from various parts of the
White House were collected by Attorney General Griffin Bell. Bell
mixed these suggestions in with his own, and passed them along to the
Solicitor General "without saying who made which ones."'8 Somehow,
this system demonstrates to Caplan the great independence the Solicitor
General's office had during the Carter adminstration. Bell's own book,
however, points out that the Solicitor General's office made some of the
White House's suggested changes, and that the brief was not filed until
President Carter himself had approved it. 9 Joseph Califano, one of the
Cabinet officers who, along with Vice President Mondale, also kibitzed
on the Bakke case, concluded, "'Our arguments and persistence had
made a difference. Although I was sorry to have ruffled the feelings of
Bell and [Solicitor General Wade] McCree, both of whom I liked, they
could be soothed.' "10
As to the current independence of the office, it has been a rare case
in the Reagan administration that the Solicitor General has been overruled; indeed, it is a rare case that the Attorney General-the Solicitor
4. L. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 188-94; see also V. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 277-323
(1977).
5.
6.
7.
8.

L. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 88.
Id. at 38.
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
L. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 47.

9. G. BELL & R. OSTROW, TAKING CARE OF THE LAW 30, 32 (1982).
10. L. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 48 (quoting J. CALIFANO, GOVERNING AMERICA: AN INSIDER'S REPORT FROM THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE CABINET 243 (1981)).
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General's boss-becomes involved at all. 1 Further, the White House in
this administration has played no appreciable role whatsoever in the Solicitor General's business-unlike, for example, the Carter administration's interference in the preparation of the Bakke brief. There is no
evidence that the filings of the current Solicitor General are more reflective of this administration's opinions than other Solicitor General filings
have been of their administrations' views. Caplan is able to conclude
that the Solicitor General is less independent than he used to be only
because The Tenth Justice exaggerates the independence the Solicitor
General has had in the past and understates it in the present.
Doubtless many career attorneys told Caplan that an erosion of the
Solicitor General's independence was taking place, but one suspects it
was not the Solicitor General's loss of power that they viewed with
alarm, but rather their own. For instance, Caplan cites as "the first hard
evidence" of the "transform[ation]" of the office the creation of a deputy
slot to be filled with an appointee of the Solicitor General's own choicei.e., a noncareer appointee. 12 This reform could not possibly erode the
Solicitor General's independence from anyone; its principal effect could
only be to enhance the Solicitor General's independence from the career
staff in his own office. The government's career lawyers of course would
like to blame someone besides the Solicitor General-preferably a sinister (to them) figure like the Attorney General or the President-for the
fact that they no longer hold the same sway, but the fact of the matter is
that their own superior wants to hear from someone besides them. Such
a revelation is never pleasant: "Why am I here at 2 a.m. if I'm not appreciated?" one assistant is quoted as complaining. 13 But it underscores that
the real complaint is that the Solicitor General has become too independent-at least from his staff-and that Caplan and his sources long for the
days when "'the Office operate[d] pretty much the same way no matter
who [was] Solicitor General.' "14
II
Nor is it a bad thing that the Solicitor General may sometimes
choose to listen to voices besides his own staff's. The simple truth is that
the Solicitor General is the President's "mouthpiece" 15 to the Supreme

11. One of the unnamed sources relied on by Caplan indicates that this is so: "I can't think of a
recent case where [Fried] was overruled [by Meese] .... " Id. at 234.
12. Id. at 62.
13. Id. at 223.
14. Id. (quoting Stern, The Solicitor General's Office and Administrative Agency Litigation, 46
A.B.A. J. 154 (1960)).
15. Id. at 18.
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Court; he is a "'tool of the administration.' ",16 The Solicitor General is
not serving two masters, no matter how frantically those inside or
outside his office want to find a master for him besides Ronald Reagan.
The Constitution empowers only three branches of government; it does
not create a fourth called the Office of the Solicitor General that works
for both the judiciary and the President. 17 Instead, the Solicitor General's office is firmly located within the executive branch of a President
who was, in this instance, elected in part because many people were unhappy with the direction the Supreme Court had taken in certain areas.
Accordingly, it is entirely appropriate that the rest of the executive
branch should have some say-and that the President and the Attorney
General should have, when necessary, the final say-in what the Solicitor
General tells the Supreme Court on the administration's behalf.
Does this mean that the Solicitor General's office should file political
tracts rather than briefs, do sloppy research, miscite precedents, or lie to
the Supreme Court? Of course not. The Court should be able to rely on
the Solicitor General to represent accurately the government's interests,
and the Solicitor General should hold himself to a higher standard of
scholarship and honesty than other advocates-both as a matter of interbranch comity and because the stakes are higher in the government's
cases. In short, the Solicitor General must be honest with the Court and
respectful to it as a coequal branch of government, just as the President
should be.
But the Solicitor General's place in the executive branch also means
that he must listen to the policy concerns of others within the administration in deciding what cases are important enough to take to the Court
and what legal principles must be most vigorously defended. It also
means that when the President or the President's principal legal officer,
the Attorney General, tells the Solicitor General that he has gotten it
wrong, the Solicitor General must listen. He is not the Court's tenth
Justice; even less is he the Court's thirty-fifth law clerk; he is, instead, the
advocate for a separate branch of government.
The Tenth Justice does not really dispute that the Solicitor General
is ultimately responsible to the Attorney General and the President.18
Rather, the book's point seems to be a more practical one: if there is too
16. Id. at 234 (quoting unnamed source).
17. Calan acknowledges that Chief Justice Rehnquist himself is "skeptical of the notion of the
[Solicitor General's] dual responsibility." Id. at 265. So was Chief Justice Burger. Lauber, An
Exchange of Views: Has the Solicitor's Offlce Become Politicized?, Legal Times, Nov. 2, 1987, at 24,
col. 1 (quoting letter from Chief Justice Burger). See generally Note, Mixing Politics and Justice:
The Office ofthe Solicitor General,4 J.L. & POLiTICS 379 (1987) (The Solicitor General has always
been and cannot be too "political.").
18. See L. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 18, 48-50.
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much interference, the independent judgment of the Solicitor General
can be clouded. As a practical matter, however, any "nonindependence"
within the Solicitor General's office will in fact sharpen its work product
for the Court. An argument should be tested and analyzed by more than
two or three people in the Solicitor General's office, none of whom may
be experts in the particular area, before it is presented to the Supreme
Court. The argument may then be discarded or reworked and tested
again. Obviously, there are limits: at some point, the cich6 that two
heads are better than one is outstripped by too many cooks spoiling the
broth. But the notion that for the Solicitor General's office to work properly it must be able to tell the rest of the executive branch to go to hell is
absurd. Again, The Tenth Justice flirts with recognition of this fact,
when it concedes that "[b]eing independent... [does] not require [the
Solicitor General to] rid[e] roughshod over the rest of the government"; 19
rather, "a skillful [Solicitor General uses] the government to help make a
reasoned decision about the law."' 20 Unfortunately, however, the larger
ramifications of the point are once again ignored.
It should be noted that there are two kinds of "interference" in the
Solicitor General's work by those outside his office: by those who cannot
overrule him, and by those who can. 2 1 The Tenth Justice blurs the two.
The former can threaten his independence only derivatively, by threatening to invoke the latter. As to the latter, while the Attorney General
clearly has the power to intervene whenever he likes, he ought to be sparing in his intervention. The Solicitor General is generally better situated
to make the legal and tactical calls; if he is not making them satisfactorily, there should probably be another Solicitor General appointed. But
The Tenth Justice never explains how the current Attorney General has
ever abused-or even used-his power. The closest it comes is an assertion that Brad Reynolds has been assigued by Attorney General Meese
19. It

at 211.

20. Id.
21. One could make a separate criticism-based on management and morale considerationsof the Solicitor General relying on those outside his office rather than on those in it. Not surprisingly, Caplan and especially his unnamed sources within the Solicitor General's office make it. Id. at
224-26. Whatever the merits of this argument (and they are limited), it hardly bears on whether the
Solicitor Gereral's authority-as opposed to that of his staff-has been eroded. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13. In any event, there is no reason to suppose that there is anything unprecedented or sinister about the Solicitor General talking with those outside his office (Caplan's own
anecdotes of decisionmaking in earlier adminstrations belie this), and it is worth noting that the
Solicitor General's staff members have regularly consulted their own contacts elsewhere in the Department of Justice. See L. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 113 (Solicitor General's staff often talked
about cases with career civil-rights lawyers); V. NAVASKY, supra note 4, at 309-11 (example of
member of Solicitor General's staff consulting with lawyers in the Civil Rights Division of Justice
about a case).

970

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1987:964

"to monitor Charles Fried's submissions as Solicitor General, ' 22 but
there is never any explanation of how this "monitoring" works. Later,
one of Caplan's own unnamed sources concedes that he cannot recall any
23
recent instances when Meese has overruled Fried.
The Tenth Justice'saccounts of the process of give-and-take between
the Solicitor General and other components of the executive branch is
gossipy, misleading and one-sided; still, it is true that this process can be
painful and frustrating for all concerued. Nonetheless, in the most important cases-and make no mistake about it, some cases are more important than others, even among those before the Supreme Court-any
wrangling and hassle between members of the Solicitor General's office
and other administration policymakers has, in the final analysis, yielded
better briefs and better decisions by the executive branch.
III
For the first time, at least since Franklin Roosevelt, we have a Solicitor General whose view of the law in some of the Supreme Court's highprofile cases has been consistently at odds in fundamental ways with the
view of a bare minority or bare majority of the Justices. Thus, in one
respect, Caplan's misperception of the Solicitor General's role would be
an easy one to make, even if Caplan were an unbiased observer. The
Solicitor General's office may well appear to be less "independent" and
more "politicized" now than it has been before. When the views of the
Solicitor General and other executive branch officials are in lockstep with
those of the Court, the legal establishment, and media critics like Lincoln
Caplan, it will be hard to discern the office's responsiveness to an administration's goals. Similarly, if the Solicitor General is arguing against
precedent or for novel (or forgotten) principles, but no jurists, professors,
or reporters kick up a fuss, the responsiveness of the Solicitor General to
an administration is rather hard to detect-and if detected, will not seem
particularly interesting. The Tenth Justice may be right that, "[iln the
past, the Justices had counted on the [Solicitor General] as a kind of
partner"; 24 it would not be surprising if some of the Justices are unhappy
that the Solicitor General is no longer endorsing their approach to the
law. But it is hardly sinister that there has come this parting of the ways;
indeed, the notion of partnership is itself a troubling one, given the principle of separation of powers. 25 An activist judiciary makes it inevitable
22. L. CAPLAN, supra note 1,at 154.
23. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
24. L. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 255.
25. Caplan at one point concedes that "[t]he ties between the Solicitor General and the
Supreme Court confound the textbook notion of checks and balances exercised by each branch of
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that there will be conflict between it and the executive branch once their
policy goals diverge.
The problem of perceived politicization of the Solicitor General's
office is, of course, aggravated by the sources The Tenth Justice draws
upon: career government lawyers who are disgruntled because they disagree with the present administration, recently graduated law clerks, and
members of the civil rights and legal establishments longing for the
"good old days" when they ran the show. All these sources, as well as
Caplan himself, want to see the politicization. It allows them to turn a
substantive objection into a procedural one, giving them an aura of objectivity, and hiding the fact that they are nothing more than sore losers
from the presidential elections of 1980 and 1984.
Here we come to the crux of the matter. Lincoln Caplan is not an
unbiased observer. There is a hint of this early on, in the second chapter,
when the best description he can provide of Alger Hiss-interestingly, an
alumnus of the Solicitor General's office-is "the central figure in a perjury trial of the nineteen-fifties."126 Caplan's bias is later betrayed in more
direct ways, some petty and some not so petty: making fun of Fried's
haircuts2 7 and accent, 28 and dropping innuendos of racism about Reynolds.29 By the last chapter, there is no doubt. It is, for instance, "hard

not to see a chain linking" President Reagan's anti-abortion position, Edwin Meese's criticism of judicial activism, and a clergyman's prayer for
30
the death of Justice Brennan.

In light of this bias, it is unsurprising that there should be a fundamentally disingenuous quality to Caplan's third theme: that the current
administration and its Solicitor General have attacked "the rule of law."
First, The Tenth Justice asserts-or quotes others as asserting-that the
government now systematically distorts facts and law in its briefs. This
government on the others," but apparently accepts and endorses the abrogation of that "textbook
notion." Id. at 33. Caplan also recounts at length the story of how one of the Solicitor General's
assistants, Philip Elman, worked secretly with Justice Frankfurter to persuade the rest of the Court
to adopt the government's position in Brown v. Board of Education. Id. at 25-32. While obliquely
acknowledging the unethical quality of this episode, id. at 29-30, Caplan characterizes it only as
"amazing." Id. at 25. See generally Elman, supra note 3, at 817, 828-30, 844 (1987) (discussing
conversations with Justice Frankfurter relating to Brown); Kennedy, A Reply to Philip Elman, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1938 n.2 (1987) (noting media response to disclosure of conversations with
Justice Frankfurter); Elman, Response, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1949, 1956-57 (1987) (rebutting charges
of unethical conduct with respect to the Frankfurter conversations).
26. L. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 15.
27. Id. at 135-36.
28. Id. at 235.
29. Id. at 60, 87, 109.
30. Id. at 271. More recently, Caplan characterized Meese as "an impresario of corruption"
and Reynolds as "a trusted crony." Caplan, LegalDifficulties, L.A. Times, Jan. 10, 1988, pt. V, at 1,
col. 3 & at 2, col. 2.
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merits only a perfunctory response: the assertion is false. The Solicitor
General would have to be crazy to distort facts or law in a Supreme
Court brief when he knows that nine Justices, their law clerks, opposing
counsel, as well as the legal press, will be scrutinizing every word. Not
only are most of these people very good lawyers, but they are likely to be
skeptical of anything asserted by a conservative administration. Suffice it
to say that the few examples given by Caplan are at worst no more than
hard advocacy-and that he makes no attempt to collect similar examples from earlier administrations, though he undoubtedly could have.
Furthermore, all objective evidence indicates that the Court still affords
great weight to the Solicitor General's arguments: in the 1985 Termthe last which Caplan discusses in detail-he concedes that eighty-three
percent of the goverument's petitions were granted 3 and that it won seventy-one percent of its cases. 32 Moreover, the Court has continued to
request, and follow, the Solicitor General's views in a large number of
cases in which the United States is not a party. 33 All this is quite odd if
the Court views the Solicitor General as untrustworthy.
The second way that Caplan sees the rule of law being undermined
is more interesting. He argues that to question Supreme Court precedent
is to undermine the rule of law. The paradigmatic example of this, of
course, is the current administration's attempts to limit or overturn the
34
landmark abortion ruling in Roe v. Wade.
At the outset, it should be stressed again that one suspects that
Caplan and others who make similar protestations really care little for
"the rule of law," except perhaps insofar as they define the rule of law to
be conducive to the substantive ends they want. Had Roe v. Wade denied women the right to obtain an abortion and had the Carter administration urged the Court to reconsider its decision, Caplan doubtlessly
would not have devoted an entire chapter in his book to the matter.
Were the Solicitor General attacking wholesale other precedents with
which he disagreed, Caplan would have written no book at all. It should
also be noted, as Caplan mentions in passing,3 5 that the abortion statute
the administration most recently attacked was upheld by only a five to
four vote: hardly the decisive rebuff one would expect to be given an
attack on the rule of law.
Nonetheless, the current Solicitor General has challenged the constitutional underpinning of Roe v. Wade, and this, concludes The Tenth
31.
32.
33.
34.

L. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 257.
Id. at 251.
Lauber, supra note 17, at 25, col. 4.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
35. L. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 248.
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Justice, evinces his contempt for the rule of law. The implausibility of
this thesis, however, is first demonstrated by the lack of any credible motive ascribed to the administration officials Caplan vilifies. Why, for instance, would Charles Fried abandon the rule of law and destroy the
institutional credibility of his office? To what end? He was not eagerly
awaiting his chance to implement some political agenda when he was
asked to come to work in the Solicitor General's office. On the contrary,
as The Tenth Justice acknowledges, 36 his interests at Harvard Law
School ran to common law and philosophy, not constitutional law and
civil rights. And why would he not stand up to the threat to the rule of
law that Caplan hypothesizes? Fried would not starve if he went back to
Harvard after resigning his post to uphold the rule of law, nor would he
be disgraced-indeed, Harvard law professors probably dream of being
the hero in such a drama. Has Archibald Cox been left destitute and
humiliated? The fact is that Fried agreed to serve and continues to serve
because he wants to defend the rule of law.
It is, indeed, The Tenth Justice's hostility to the substance of the
administration's agenda that so fills its secondary title-The Solicitor
Generaland the Rule of Law-with irony. For if this administration is
trying to do something radical, it is that it is trying to restore the rule of
law. The fact is that there can be no rule of law unless it is rooted in the
written text and discernible intent of those who drafted it. For Fried and
Reynolds to have done anything less than they have to reinstate a jurisprudence rooted in text, structure, and intent-the only legitimate
sources for predecent-would have been precisely to abandon the rule of
law.
This is not to say that difficult problems will not arise for the committed executive branch lawyer, especially when he is confronted with
precedents that do not honor the rule of law. After all, the judiciary has
the final say-aside from constitutional amendment or congressional
clarification-as to what the law is. Nor is it always easy to determine
what the text and original intent require; it is especially difficult to determine the level of generality with which constitutional principles are to be
interpreted. Fortunately, the Supreme Court and the executive branch
are not at loggerheads very often; each, as an institution, generally shares
the same view of what the rule of law requires.
Surely, however, there is nothing dishonorable about the highest advocate of the executive branch occasionally and respectfully asking, explicitly or implicitly, that the nation's highest court reconsider its past
36. Id. at 135.
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decisions.3 7 It was not "humility" when other Solicitors General in good
faith declined to do so, and it is not "arrogance" when the Solicitor General now does not decline to do So. 3 8 It is, instead, the fulfillment of the
highest responsibility of the Solicitor General, or of any government official: to defend the Constitution.
This is not an extreme view. Dean Paul Brest of Stanford, who
hardly shares the administration's views on most legal matters, has recently written, "I agree with the essence of Attorney General Edwin
Meese's recent statement that the Court is not the Constitution," and
"we surely retain the right to criticize-to say that [the Justices] got it
wrong."'3 9 Two of Caplan's heroes also provide implicit support for this
view: Archibald Cox, who pointed out that the Warren Court's activism
itself "undermined the rule of law," 4° and former Deputy Solicitor General Andrew Frey, who Caplan acknowledges deliberately chipped away
at the decision in Miranda v. Arizona.41 And the Court, Caplan concedes, has reversed itself more in recent years, and decides cases by closer
and more fragmented votes. 42 Under these circumstances, who can fault
an advocate for asserting that the Court's precedents and the rule of law
may sometimes diverge?
In what may be the most disingenuous passage in his disingenuous
book, Caplan suggests that the Reagan administration is largely to blame
for the Court's divisions, reversals, and " 'rootless activism,' -43 castigating the administration especially for criticizing the Court's abortion ruling. Such criticism, Caplan argues, defeats "law as a means for building
consensus." 44 In our republic, however, law is the consensus, and the
responsibility for forging it does not devolve upon courts. That is a fundamental premise of our rule of law and, as another branch's advocate,
the Solicitor General should not hesitate to remind the Court-carefully
37. Several Justices have already gone on record as disputing Caplan's assertions that they have
said they do not view Fried as an honorable advocate. See, e.g., Legal Times, Nov. 2, 1987, at 2-3;
Lauber, supra note 17, at 25, cols. 1-3.
38. See L. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 170-71 (discussing remarks by former Deputy Solicitor
General Louis F. Claiborne).
39. Brest, Affirmative Action and the Constitution: Three Theories, 72 IOWA L. REV. 281, 281
(1987).
40. L. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 188 C" '[D]ecisions seem to turn on intuitive judgments of right
and wrong rather than the impartial application of principle'" (quoting A. Cox, THE WARREN
COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REFORM 22-23 (1968))).

41. Id. at 216-17.
42. Id. at 268-69.
43. Id. at 268-73 (quoting Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Burger Court, in THE BURGER
COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 198, 210-17 (V. Blasi ed. 1983)).
44. Id. at 273.
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and respectfully, but firmly-of this fact from time to time as necessary,
even if it makes him less useful and welcome as a "thirty-fifth law clerk."

